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Abstract
The investigation of Sudden Unexpected Child Death is complex because 
whilst most children who die suddenly do so because of natural causes, it 
is sometimes difficult to detect when a child has, in fact, been unlawfully 
killed. The system in England and Wales involves a joint agency response 
to child death and for various reasons the police contribution to 
that investigation is sometimes inadequate. The arguments presented 
in the paper are made on the basis of empirically derived findings, 
drawing from original research based upon qualitative interviews 
with nine senior detectives working in the areas of child abuse or 
major crime, as well as focus groups of senior detectives, and a 
limited contribution from pathologists. This paper explores whether 
there is an investigative deficit in respect of potential child homicide 
when compared to an adult domestic homicide and it concludes that in 
some areas the most vulnerable people in society may be at risk 
because of issues such as inadequate training, inflexible force policies, 
and under-resourced police investigation of child death. The findings 
reveal important implications for police investigative training and a 
clear and significant deficit in the investigative resources available to 
the lead investigator on a child death investigation which may or may not 
be a homicide, compared with the resources available to the senior 
investigating officer on a straightforward domestic homicide when the 
victim is an adult.
Introduction and background
The majority of children who die do so from natural causes, and the 
disease, genetic condition, or ailment is often easily and quickly identified. 
However, there are approximately 230 deaths of babies and toddlers 
every year in 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
2the UK which despite an investigation, remain unexplained (Lullaby Trust, 
2015). In respect of an infant (a child under 1 year of age), the 
phenomenon known as SIDS is probably the cause of death in most cases 
of unexpected death. This notion is supported by Kennedy (2004, 2016). 
However, SIDS is not a diagnosis; it is a label perhaps designed to remove 
a stigma or feeling of lifelong guilt from bereaved parents. This 
phenomenon is not understood at all well, and no-one actually knows the 
mechanism which occurs to cause death (Emery, 1989) although 
suggestions such as the ‘Triple Risk Hypothesis’ (Guntheroth & Spiers, 
2002) – i.e. an infant whose physiological development is slightly behind, 
who has a minor ailment such as a small infection, and who lives in a sub-
optimal environment such as a house where people smoke - attempt to 
explain what may cause an infant to die. Suggestions such as these are no 
more than a ‘best guess’ at what may have happened, and in the absence 
of identifying a conclusive natural cause of death the possibility that the 
child has been deliberately killed remains plausible as an explanation.
It is widely accepted that within the number of cases which over the years 
have been classified as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), Sudden 
Unexpected Death in Childhood (SUDC), or Cot Death, a hidden proportion 
is in fact the result of maltreatment or deliberate harm (e.g. Emery, 1993; 
Levene and Bacon, 2004; Fox, 2007).  These cases of homicide may remain 
undetected for reasons which could include a failure of the ‘joint agency 
response’ (HMG, 2018). In other words, there is a failure either by 
Paediatricians or Pathologists to observe subtle physical signs that a child 
has suffered maltreatment or a failure by Police investigators to carry out 
a thorough and searching investigation on behalf of the Coroner. 
Estimates of the proportion of SIDS registered cases which are in fact 
undetected homicides vary considerably, although some authors suggest 
up to 10% - 20% may be frank homicide, with maltreatment (abuse or 
neglect) being a contributory, though not necessarily a causal, factor in a 
similar proportion (e.g. Emery, 1993; Fleming et al., 2000; Levene and 
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3Bacon, 2004; Sidebotham et al., 2005). For policing purposes, it does not 
really matter what the proportion is, but rather it should be considered 
unacceptable for there to be any deliberate killing of a human being which 
does not attract a full and professional investigation.
Marshall (2012) estimates that there are probably between 69 and 84 child 
homicides in England and Wales each year. The reason the number is rather 
vague is that as discussed above, within the number of known deaths which 
end up being classified as SIDS or Unascertained there is an unknown 
number of ‘covert homicides’ (Vaughan and Kautt, 2009) which are never 
identified as crime. Because they cannot defend themselves it is accepted 
that it may be possible to kill a small child and leave no physical trace of 
an assault. This is supported by Truman and Ayoub (2002) who suggest 
that deliberate suffocation of a baby rarely leaves any physical signs, 
making it impossible to differentiate from SIDS on clinical grounds alone.  
In some cases it is understandable that even the most thorough and 
professional investigation by a police officer, paediatrician and pathologist 
might fail to identify that crime has occurred. There are likely to be other 
cases however where stones are left unturned and clues not found because 
of a lack of police resourcing or a lack of expertise by the investigating 
officer. 
In respect of children over the age of 1 year the label known as SIDS cannot 
be used to explain the death, and if the joint agency investigation 
subsequently fails to identify the cause, such a case would usually be 
classified as “Unascertained”. In respect of children over one year of age 
and the consequent absence of SIDS being a possibility, the failure to 
recognise an undetected homicide is more likely to be as a result of an 
inadequacy in the police contribution to the joint agency investigation. This 
is because the detection of a disease or genetic condition is a scientific 
process with certainty as an end result, whereas the police investigation of 
a potential homicide is, in large part, an art and its success is dependent 
on the decision making of the Lead Investigator, the adequacy of their 
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4training, and the staff resources available to him or her, because these 
factors all dictate the amount of activity conducted to uncover any possible 
clues as to the cause of death.
This paper will identify and explore some of the factors which tend to make 
the successful discovery and subsequent investigation of child homicide 
problematic. The consequences of a failure by police to identify when a child 
has been unlawfully killed is of great consequence, not just in providing 
some posthumous justice for the deceased but, and perhaps more 
importantly, in ensuring the protection of any living siblings or those yet to 
be born.
Method
The paper has been informed by an original research study carried out by 
the Author between March and July 2019 seeking to explore the question, 
“Is there an investigative deficit in respect of SUDC which could mean that 
the likelihood of the death of a child which is in fact homicide, but not 
recognised at that point, is less likely to be identified as such compared to 
an adult?”. The conclusions draw on data gathered using qualitative 
research methodology including interview and focus group data. Fielding 
(2000) indicates that much police research is rooted in this method, and it 
may be considered that, given one is likely to be interviewing confident, 
professional people, this made it the most appropriate method of gathering 
data.
The research was designed to include participants with a range of different 
perspectives on SUDC investigation, specifically senior detectives from the 
Major Crime and Child Abuse Investigation disciplines, and a small number 
of Home Office registered Forensic and Paediatric Pathologists. The 
respondents were therefore chosen carefully for their knowledge and 
expertise in the subject, and the likelihood that they would represent 
different standpoints on the issues in question. The sample represents what 
Patton (2001) calls a ‘purposeful sample’.
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5Detailed qualitative face to face interviews were conducted with a sample 
of 4 current Major Crime SIOs from two different police areas, and 5 Senior 
Detectives from Child Abuse Investigation Units working in four different 
Force areas. These interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. The 
transcripts were loaded into NVivo 12 CAQDAS software which assisted with 
coding and analysis of the interviews using adapted Grounded Theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The adapted version of Grounded Theory 
employed followed the position taken by Strauss (1990); consistent with 
other adapted versions of Grounded Theory, the application primarily 
focussed on the coding and preliminary validation stages, as these were 
judged most appropriate to the data available.
A survey was emailed to 6 pathologists represented by 2 Specialist 
Paediatric Pathologists and 4 Forensic Pathologists, all of whom have been 
involved in child death cases. The questionnaires were tightly focused on 
the research question, 3 Forensic Pathologists agreed to take part in the 
study and their responses were included within the package of data loaded 
into NVivo and coded and analysed alongside the other material.
Finally, to explore and test one of the key issues which had emerged during 
early interviews, two focus groups each consisting of 5 senior detectives, 
with a mix from the Major Crime Teams and Child Abuse Investigation 
Teams in two separate police force areas, were given a case description 
relating to a straightforward child homicide investigation, and the groups 
were asked to discuss and estimate the resourcing levels which would be 
allocated to the case and the activity which would be generated. The results 
were compiled on flipcharts and the data, together with commentary, is 
provided in a table below. 
The limitations of the design are such that although a total of 22 
participants provided data for analysis, from a policing perspective they 
were limited to four force areas (out of the 43 forces in England and Wales), 
and arguably each individual element of the sample is itself not large. 
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6Position Role Number 
Detective chief inspector MCT 2
Detective inspector MCT 2
Detective inspector CAIU 8
Detective sergeant CAIU 7
Forensic Home Office Pathologist n/a 3
Total respondents 22
Figure 1. Breakdown of Respondents Sampled
The research reported in this paper was conducted in accordance with the 
advice contained in the British Society of Criminology Statement of Ethics 
(2015).
Findings and Discussion
The effect of police budget cuts on major crime investigation
Much of the recent discourse in policing is dominated by a perception that 
the quality of police work, and in the context of this paper, the quality of 
investigation have been affected by public sector budget cuts. It might be 
It is recognised (Bryman, 2004) that qualitative researchers have a 
particular responsibility to ensure they fairly and accurately reach their 
conclusions, so as to guard against the possibility that an ill thought out, 
non-representative anecdote from a respondent might adversely influence 
an inference or conclusion. The mixed, cross discipline design of the 
research enabled the Researcher to test and validate comments being 
made about the key issues. However the limitations of a qualitative 
research design are also recognised, and while the findings are suggestive 
and allow us to identify some important dimensions of the research 
questions and hypotheses, the analysis cannot be definitive or conclusive. 
It is noted that a qualitative approach is often adopted in pioneering, 
exploratory research and it is intended that this paper provides a 
contribution to an evaluation of the current state of SUDC investigation in 
England and Wales, and further research is suggested in the conclusion.
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7“There has been a huge impact on our resources and it is getting very 
difficult now to properly investigate the cases we get. Every homicide 
we deal with is under-resourced.” (MC 5)
useful to briefly explore whether this is the case, and if so, how it might be 
affecting homicide investigation and in particular the investigation of child 
homicide.
It is confirmed by Brogden and Ellison (2013) that since 2010 the Police 
Service in England and Wales has suffered severe budget cuts and that a 
dramatic reduction in policing services has occurred. A recent study by 
Hargreaves (et al, 2018) reveals that there was a reduction of 21,000 police 
officers between 2010 and 2018, bringing overall Police Service numbers 
down to 122,404. The evidence that since 2010 the Police have had to 
mitigate against Government funding cuts is therefore incontrovertible, and 
since for all Police Forces the staff salary portion of their overall budget is 
around 80% (e.g. PCC Hampshire, 2017) it has been inevitable that to 
achieve necessary savings officer numbers have been reduced to well under 
their authorised maximum establishments. Evidence outlined below 
indicates that the Major Crime Teams (MCT) created in many police forces 
to primarily deal with homicide cases, have not been protected from staff 
reductions. 
Although due to their partisanship it is often unhelpful to cite politicians in 
an academic paper, in June 2019 it was reported in The Guardian (a UK 
National Newspaper) that in 2019 Freedom of Information requests to all 
43 UK police forces were made by the Labour Party Policing Spokesperson. 
This survey claimed to reveal that “the number of detectives in major crime 
and murder squads has been cut by 28%” (Dodd, 2019). This figure is 
broadly supported by the respondents in the present study.  
All MCT participants (n = 4) confirmed that their teams had been subject 
to significant reductions in investigator numbers over the last few years. 
Specific utterances include:
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8“There has been a huge reduction in resources in major crime teams 
even in the last 15 months we’ve significantly reduced again. We 
skimmed right back so you have not only got low numbers in terms of 
people, we also go often in collaboration and a lot of that continuous 
push –pull between the teams and the different SIOs over a very small 
pot of people to do the work. There were 5 DCIs- that’s gone down to 
4. And there were 5 DIs that’s gone down to 4. So we’ve lost a DCI
and a DI from each crime. In respect of detective constables, in [my
force] we went from 18 DCs down to 12.” (MC1)
It could perhaps be argued that officers such as these, who are competing 
with other parts of their force for resources, are hardly likely to paint a 
healthy picture of their staffing levels, but one of the MCT Respondents 
actually did provide the Researcher with a picture – photographic evidence 
– to illustrate the reduction in his MCT over the past 10 years.
“Undoubtedly [there have been staff reductions]. Recently I arranged 
for the major crime team across the force to have a team photograph 
after a CPD day. And one of the reasons I did that, other than it’s a 
nice thing to do, was to emphasise the point that our numbers have 
greatly reduced since the last time the team had a team photograph. 
So we have both of those photographs [shown to the Researcher] and 
it’s difficult to put a number on it off top of my head, but I would say 
that we are probably somewhere in the region of a third to 50 percent 
less staff now that what we were 10 years ago.” (MC3)
It was fortuitous that one MCT Respondent had, before they joined the MCT 
been part of the ‘Change Programme’ Team which had to decide where 
staffing cuts in the force would fall. When asked whether police budget cuts 
had any effect on major crime teams, this Respondent made an illuminating 
comment from that other perspective:
“Yes, sure.  I’ve only been on major crime since [5 months ago] 
although I spent 2 years on what was called the Specialist Crime 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
9Capabilities Programme which is basically a budget cutting change 
programme for specialist crime which includes major crime, where we 
had to make 20 percent savings across the whole specialist crime 
including major crime. It did not have to be 20 percent from each 
discipline, it had to be 20 percent across the board. So that was 
relatively recent so obviously there were cuts within major crime and 
changes to processes and roles as a part of that process in order to 
save money and improve efficiency” (MC 2)
Having therefore obtained supporting evidence that the report in the 
Guardian newspaper (Dodd, 2019) is likely to be accurate, it was important 
to explore whether the workload of the teams had reduced in line with their 
staffing reductions. As a follow up question to all MCT Respondents they 
were asked whether there were fewer murders or serious crimes to deal 
with now, but all claimed that their core workload had not reduced, and in 
fact one respondent remarked:
“No, it’s gone the other way. It’s gone up, particularly in the last 2 to 
3 years, there has been a significant increase in work.” (MC3)
The present study was designed to establish whether the investigation of 
childhood death, and in particular the chances of successfully establishing 
whether such a death is in fact homicide, may be adversely affected by 
these changes in the staffing levels of MCTs. Although none of the MCT 
Respondents indicated that their team would not normally deal with cases 
of child death which had clearly been identified as homicide from the outset, 
as discussed earlier it is often very difficult to make that early 
determination. It is accepted that even with clearly identified adult 
homicides many are 'self-solvers' as described by Martin Innes (2003), so 
not a lot of detective work is required in their investigation. However, it is 
argued in this paper that due partly to complex pathology and controversy 
over medical evidence, as well as the fact that the child victim is often cared 
for by the perpetrators, meaning less reliance can be placed upon trace 
forensic evidence, child murders are rarely ‘self-solvers’ and do need a lot 
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10
“On the day, a DI and a DS. Possibly with access to a couple of 
investigators” (CA3)
“Definitely two, with a Detective Sergeant accompanying myself. 
Additional staff could possibly be made available if necessary.” (CA5)
“Resource wise I am probably going to say DI, DS and 5 DCs. If it was 
a late night one, or a weekend, there would be fewer people involved.” 
CA2)
of detective work and multi-agency cooperation to solve. The next part of 
the discussion will explore whether there is a disparity, or deficit, in respect 
of resourcing and training for those investigating a sudden unexpected child 
death when compared with those officers investigating the suspicious death 
of an adult.
Resourcing and training for child death investigation 
One of the peculiarities with child homicide is that even if a police force has 
a dedicated Major Crime Team, as will be discussed later, there is 
sometimes ambiguity as to whether they will actually investigate this sort 
of crime, or whether it will be investigated by officers from the Child Abuse 
Investigation Units (CAIU). What is probably universal is that until a sudden 
unexpected child death has been identified as suspicious, it is extremely 
unlikely that a Major Crime Team would become involved at all, so the early 
lines of enquiry to determine whether or not there are suspicions will 
normally be carried out by a small group of CAIU officers often led by a 
Detective Inspector or a Detective Sergeant who may well not have any 
standardised training in homicide investigation. In the present study it was 
reported by Respondents from the CAIUs that the typical resourcing for a 
SUDC would be a small team perhaps consisting of a Detective Inspector 
and 2 or 3 investigators. When asked if they were the Lead Investigator on 
a regular SUDC case and how many staff they were likely to have on their 
investigation team, these responses were representative of that group:
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“I’ll be expecting, to include my specialist leads as well, so crime scene 
managers, CSIs etc. So I’ll be looking at 12 to 14.” (MC1)
“I would have 4 DSs and 20 investigators - DCs and IOs. It will be 
anyone who is working. If it is a new job, everyone who is working.” 
(MC2)
And a respondent who had been called out to exactly such a case a few 
days beforehand recalled:
“I would say we had about something in the region of 20 investigative 
officers in total to deal with what was a fairly contained job.” (MC3)
Interestingly, this latter Respondent had previously worked as a Detective 
Inspector on a CAIU and claimed to have investigated 26 SUDC cases.  The 
Respondent MC3 confirmed that typically in those cases the ‘team’ would 
have just consisted of themself plus 1 Detective Sergeant.
It is important at this point to note that of the two types of cases described, 
the adult case is identified as a homicide, whereas the child case is still to 
be determined as either natural death or a suspicious death. It could be 
argued therefore that the study is comparing apples with pears. In one 
sense a SUDC is ‘just another’ type of sudden death investigation however, 
the position taken in this paper is that the sudden and unexpected death 
of a child should never be considered as a routine event. The police have 
traditionally attended any case of sudden death resulting from an unknown 
cause, and their duties can include the verification of death and the 
submission of a report to the Coroner (Fox, 2007). Usually a single 
It was then interesting to contrast these numbers with the MCT 
Respondents who were asked how many staff they would deploy if the case 
was a straightforward domestic homicide where the victim was an adult – 
for example, a husband kills his wife within their home. Even on such a 
classic ‘self-solver’ (Innes, 2003), the MCT Respondents claimed they were 
likely to work with a team of around 12-20 detectives at their disposal. 
These responses are representative of that group:
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12
uniformed police officer would attend the report of a sudden death of 
an elderly person and they make only basic enquiries to check if any 
crime may have occurred. There would usually be no involvement by a 
specialist investigator because elderly people die as a matter of course 
and sudden death cases are a common occurrence. However, as 
discussed above, unexpected childhood death is relatively rare in 
England and Wales, and they should never be considered by the 
police as routine natural and inevitable events. Indeed, the College of 
Policing guidance on this subject is clear that “Healthy children are not 
meant to die, and when they do these children deserve the right to have 
the death fully investigated in order that a cause of death can be 
identified , and homicide excluded” (ACPO, 2014, p.5).
It is clear from the empirical evidence in the current study that the police 
in England and Wales do not treat SUDC cases as ‘routine’ sudden deaths, 
and all Respondents confirmed that a Detective Inspector, rather than a 
uniformed constable, would investigate SUDC in their area. An 
important step was taken by ACPO (now the National Police Chiefs 
Council) to encourage Chief Constables to ensure that SUDC was 
resourced with at least a minimum number of investigators. The College 
of Policing Guidance (ACPO, 2014, p.13) suggests, “The thorough 
investigation of an unexpected child death cannot be carried out by a 
single investigator. Even when there are no apparent suspicions, as a 
minimum it is suggested that a team of three investigators will be required 
to assess and manage scenes, carry out interviews and follow lines of 
enquiry”. This guidance perhaps helps to ensure that the sudden death 
of a child is investigated far more thoroughly than would be the case if 
the deceased was an elderly adult, and broadly this current research 
indicates that the sort of investigator resourcing expected in the 
guidance is being adhered to. However, an important thrust of the 
present paper is to contribute to a discussion as to whether, despite 
recent improvements, more could or should be done to detect when a 
SUDC case is, in fact, homicide.
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13
It has already been established that for those SUDC cases that are in fact 
homicides but have not been identified as such, the resources deployed are 
likely to be far fewer, and consequently the depth of the investigation is 
likely to be far lower, than as would be the case if an adult sudden death 
was identified as suspicious from the outset. This might seem an obvious 
statement but the significant factor is that it is far harder to kill an adult 
without leaving some fairly clear clues that a crime has taken place, so 
most adult homicides are identified as such from the outset and the 
necessary resources are then deployed, usually from a Force Major Crime 
Team. By contrast, as pointed out above, it is entirely possible to kill a small 
child yet leave few, if any, clues. For this reason the early investigation of 
a SUDC really needs to be well resourced and well managed. As Marshall 
(2012, p.32) points out, “an incorrect [initial] assessment may lead to 
essential evidence being lost and justice denied for the parties affected”. 
The challenge for the police therefore is to deploy sufficient resources and 
carry out sufficient investigative activity, in order to ensure that murders 
are not missed. Equally challenging is the fact that CAIU officers 
investigating a SUDC are expected to do their work with sensitivity and 
discretion to avoid stigmatising innocent families (ACPO, 2014, p.6). 
Because no serious crime has been identified, there are fewer legal powers 
available to them to access potential evidence. For example, they would be 
unable to obtain an authority under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 to examine telephone call data, and they would be unable to 
obtain a search warrant under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 2004 
to search the victim’s home and seize evidence.  This is not to say that the 
home would not be visited, but to do so in a SUDC case would have to be 
with the agreement of the child’s parents at a time of their choosing which, 
if they had actually killed their child, is clearly problematic. Although the 
College of Policing Child Death Investigation Guidance (ACPO, 2014, p.1) 
suggests that, “Even when there are no apparent suspicious factors, the 
police contribution to the investigation must be detailed and thorough”, the 
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evidence reported thus far is that CAIU Lead Investigators may not have 
sufficient resources to carry out all the investigative work necessary. 
Furthermore, in respect of their training, it is unlikely that CAIU officers will 
be equipped with the same knowledge and theoretical grounding as their 
colleagues from MCT, and this will be briefly examined.
The Senior Investigating Officers Development Programme (SIODP) is the 
current programme provided by the College of Policing which allows senior 
homicide investigators to become accredited at what is known in policing 
circles as PIP Level 3. Although a CAIU Detective Inspector may, by chance, 
have undertaken this training and be accredited at PIP Level 3, it is not a 
requirement. The CAIU respondents in this, albeit small, study confirmed 
that none had received PIP Level 3 training.
Having established that those working on a SUDC may have fewer 
resources and less than optimum training to help them identify whether a 
SUDC is in fact a homicide, it will be useful to establish exactly what the 
potential investigative steps might be in straightforward domestic homicide 
cases. 
It may be useful to first briefly look more generally at some expected 
elements of any police homicide investigation.  Neyroud and Disley (2007, 
p.552) pointed out, that since the review into the flawed Yorkshire Ripper 
enquiry (Byford, 1981) there has been a drive to “standardise the way 
major crime investigations are managed”. The vehicles which have been 
used to try and achieve that standardisation include the set of documents 
known collectively as College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice 
(APP), and in particular the Murder Investigation Manual (ACPO, 2006) and 
the Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP)
(ACPO, 2005). The former document gives tactical advice and suggested 
investigative techniques and the latter document provides a bureaucratic 
system for setting up a major enquiry and dealing with the enormous 
amount of information which a murder enquiry can generate.
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RESOURCES EARLY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
SIO (DCI) Forensic recovery - Suspect(s)
Deputy SIO (DI) Secure death scene and full forensic search
Office manager Secure victim as a scene
Case Officer (DS) Arrange forensic post-mortem
Indexers for HOLMES IT System Interviews with suspects
Analyst Capture passive data (CCTV, ANPR etc.)
Crime Scene Manager Seize electronic devices, digital media, phones
Intelligence Manager House to House strategy
Family Liaison Officer Full intelligence checks on suspect(s)
Search Advisor (POLSA) Identify and interview witnesses
Interview Advisor Community Impact Assessment
Outside Enquiry Team (DS plus 8 DCs) Media strategy
Figure 2. Response from focus groups
Childhood death investigative deficit
Homicide investigation is considered to be at the pinnacle of police work 
and the process by which it is carried out is highly systemised, methodical, 
and involves the coordination of a lot of people from different disciplines. 
By contrast, the initial investigation of a SUDC which, as indicated by 
Marshall (2012), may be the one chance to establish if it is in fact a 
homicide will, as the current research reveals, likely be led by a Detective 
Inspector or a Detective Sergeant from a Child Abuse Investigation Unit, 
who has not been trained to PIP Level 3 standard, and who will typically 
have no more than 2 or 3 investigators working with them. When 
comparing this evidence with the table at figure 2 it seems clear that there 
To gather some empirical data on this topic, two focus groups were created, 
each consisting of 5 senior detectives, none of whom were the main 
respondents for the study. These 10 officers were not interviewed, but were 
simply asked to create a flipchart which would indicate what investigative 
activity they would expect to carry out if they were asked to investigate a 
child death case which, from the outset, was believed to be suspicious – in 
other words where there were clear criminally inflicted injuries. The 
following table, Figure 2 is a representation of the result of their 
consideration.
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is a huge disparity in terms of numbers of officers working on the case, and 
consequently with the amount of investigative activity that can reasonably 
be carried out.
As an example of how damaging this lack of resourcing can be, not only in 
respect of surviving or future siblings within the family, but also to the 
reputation of the force concerned and its investigators, the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC – now known as IOPC) Report into the 
flawed investigation after the SUDC involving 1 year old Poppi Worthington 
(IPCC, 2014) concluded that the Detective Inspector from the CAIU who 
was initially in charge of the investigation failed to attend the scene, offered 
no direction of scene management, and failed to secure important 
evidence. However, it is also clear from reading the Report that, “…she had 
not been trained as an SIO and she had only attended a detective inspector 
course many years previous” (IPCC, 2014, p.25). Neither had she been 
provided with any specialist training in child death investigation (IPCC, 
2014. P26). It is also clear from the IPCC Report that this Detective 
Inspector had no ‘team’ as such, and in the vital ‘Golden Hour’ period (Cook 
and Tattersall, 2010) of this complex enquiry she was attempting to 
investigate with just 2 uniformed officers who had been earlier deployed by 
the Force Control Room. The ‘Golden Hour’ is defined as, “…the principle 
that effective early action can result in the recovery of significant material 
which might otherwise be lost to the enquiry forever” (ACPO, 2006, p.42). 
After his Inquest into Poppi’s death, the Coroner wrote in his findings, 
“There were numerous errors and failings in the first investigation … it is 
relevant to note that many pieces of potentially relevant evidence were not 
gathered or obtained” (Roberts, 2018, p3.4). 
The initial investigation into the Poppi Worthington death was therefore 
considered by the Coroner and the IPCC to be inadequate and the Detective 
Inspector in charge of the initial enquiry did not have sufficient experience 
training or resources, but the evidence provided by Respondents in the 
current research indicates that the experience of this Detective Inspector 
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“There was a case that happened in [my area] of a child who collapsed 
in co-sleeping circumstances. A child was asleep on dad’s chest. Dad 
allegedly falls asleep on the sofa watching a film, wakes up, child is 
not alive. We conducted our usual investigation just me and a DS. We 
found no cause for concern but we could only do a cursory scene 
examination, all of it being under no powers. I don’t believe there was 
any forensic input into that process. So that was the response to it. 
Anyway, 2 or 3 days later the CT scan comes back - query bleed on 
the brain and retinal haemorrhaging, and there were clear fractures in 
the ribs some of which radiologists were saying were suggestive of NAI 
[non-accidental injury]. So 3 days down the line, having not protected 
your scene, not done any kind of really intrusive inquiries that you 
would do on a major crime investigation around movements, 
behaviours, and all the rest of it, you suddenly are playing catch up 
with a murder investigation. So a bit of a mess that did not resolve in 
any prosecution and in the end we don’t really know whether that child 
was murdered” (MC3).
It is suggested here that there is an investigative deficit between a SUDC 
investigation and an identified child (or adult) homicide investigation 
because the SUDC investigation falls into a gap of uncertainty. It might be 
a homicide, but it probably isn’t and, put simply, the Major Crime Teams 
may only investigate known homicide cases, yet sometimes the CAIU 
investigators have neither the resources nor training to adequately conduct 
a thorough enough investigation which may identify that it is, in fact, 
is not unique. One of the Respondents who worked in the CAIU expressed 
the view that they are still trying to conduct their SUDC investigations with 
insufficient resources, and this means that the quality of the work 
conducted, and the lines of enquiry fulfilled are both compromised. The 
Respondent gave a case example to illustrate that important evidence 
which might confirm homicide can be lost:
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homicide. Hence, some child homicides forever remain unrecognised as 
such. 
This point of view is supported by one of the Forensic Pathologists (FP2) 
contributing to the study. They explained that the pathological findings in 
child death cases, particularly in respect of shaking injuries to a baby, are 
often challenged vigorously in criminal courts which makes pathologists 
very wary about giving an early opinion, even when they may be fairly sure 
that homicide is confirmed.  This Respondent also put forward the argument 
that in many child death cases the only way to demonstrate that the death 
is probably natural is to confirm the absence of injury, and that the only 
way to do that is a thorough and open minded autopsy where one looks for 
injury. This may seem patently obvious, but the point may equally apply to 
the police investigation. If the absence of crime is not confirmed through a 
thorough and well-resourced investigation, the possibility that the child has 
been murdered remains.
From the evidence gathered during the current study it has thus far been 
possible to draw an inference that in some SUDC cases CAIU investigators 
may not have the training or resources available to adequately rule out 
homicide or confirm it. It is also possible to draw an inference that MCTs 
have been subject to cuts in staff numbers of up to 30%, yet the number 
of homicide cases they are expected to deal with has not gone down.  The 
final theme for discussion therefore is whether, even in cases where the 
CAIU investigator has a suspicion that the case is homicide, the MCT will 
take the case over and run a properly resourced enquiry as indicated in 
Figure 2.
The transfer to MCT in suspicious cases
Evidence from the current respondents indicated that there are variations 
as to when a force or regional MCT may take over a child death case. In 
one area every SUDC is ‘overseen’ by a trained MCT SIO. Under this model, 
although they will not act as the Lead Investigator or provide resources, 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
19
 “Not until a forensic post mortem had given homicide as the cause of 
death”. (MC5)
This position was broadly confirmed by all CAIU Respondents, for example:
“Only if clearly manslaughter or murder. Sus death likely to remain 
with CAIU” (CA3)
“A suspicious death which isn’t confirmed is likely to [remain with 
CAIU] - depends on which SIO we ask!” (CA2)
When asked if the staffing cuts in MCTs had made them more discerning 
about which cases they would take on, one Respondent said:
“Yes. Well it is mixed whether the MIT will take on child homicide if 
that’s what you mean. It can depend on the SIO who they speak to. 
Some may take a suspicious child death immediately but as we lose 
more and more staff there is a tendency to push back on jobs until it 
is clear that we are dealing with a murder.” (MC5)
Other MCT Respondents (MC2, MC3) said that in their team the trigger for 
MCT taking over a case would be if, and when, a Pathologist confirmed 
homicide.
The flaw in this proposition is that the pathology in a child death is largely 
a lengthy process of excluding natural causes until homicide is the only 
they do at least keep a ‘watching brief’ on the case and they will act in an 
advisory capacity to the CAIU Lead Investigator. It was explained by the 
Respondent (MC3) that this model is possible because the force has 
structured its investigators in such a way that CAIU and MCT teams all sit 
within the same wider department under a single Detective Superintendent. 
In other areas however, there is absolutely no involvement by the Major 
Crime Team until a homicide has been confirmed. This is evidenced by a 
Detective Chief Inspector from a Major Crime Team who was asked when, 
if at all, her team would feel that a child death would come within her team’s 
remit to take it over and she replied:
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“If for example the child dies and a thin bilateral subdural haemorrhage 
is found at PM, this is clearly very suspicious but to prove the retinal 
haemorrhages and examine the fixed brain will require specialist 
ophthalmic pathology and neuropathology, which typically takes 
months to complete.  It follows that there may be a delay before the 
job is confirmed as definite homicide.  Even if there is ante mortem 
evidence of trauma, specialist ophthalmic pathology and 
neuropathology will still be needed, as well as possibly bone pathology, 
so though it may be pretty clear the child/infant has been assaulted, a 
definitive statement will almost certainly take several months to 
complete.” (FP1)  
Another Forensic Pathologist (FP2) who carries out all their own histology 
rather than sending the organs to an external expert, also confirmed that 
in child death cases it would often be 5 or 6 months before they were able 
to provide the police with a firm conclusion that homicide was the cause of 
death.
It follows then that if the initial police investigation is not properly resourced 
until homicide is identified then clearly, as in the Poppi Worthington  case,  
much physical evidence could be lost, as well as opportunities for forensic 
recovery at the death scene, passive data recovery, or digital media 
investigation (see Figure 2). 
The other rather illogical position with a Major Crime Team not accepting 
the case until a Forensic Post Mortem has concluded homicide is that for 
any SUDC to even be subject to a Forensic Post Mortem examination there 
must have been sufficient suspicions to convince a Coroner that this type 
plausible explanation (Krous et al. 2005). It was confirmed by all the 
pathologists contributing to this study that even where there are initial 
suspicions, this takes a long time because various histology has to be 
carried out on tissue and internal organs. When asked how long this process 
would typically take, a Forensic Pathologist replied:
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of Post Mortem examination is required. According to Peres (2017) a 
Forensic Post Mortem in England and Wales costs the police £4,000 in an 
average case, and therefore one is only requested by police when the 
suspicions of crime are already fairly high. The MCT Respondents in the 
current study confirmed that it is almost certainly the case that if an adult 
sudden death was felt to be suspicious enough to warrant a highly 
expensive Forensic Post Mortem., the force MCT would certainly be running 
the investigation from the outset, and they would not wait several weeks 
or months for formal confirmation of homicide before deploying their 
extensive resources and investigative services.
Finally, there is also evidence from some Respondents in the current 
research (MC1, MC2, MC3, CA2), that in their Forces it is not even certain 
that the dedicated Major Crime Team will take over an investigation even 
when homicide is confirmed. This could be because a long passage of time 
has elapsed until such confirmation and the CAIU simply keep the enquiry 
themselves because they have done a lot of the work they believe is 
required. This, in itself, does not necessarily mean a lower quality of 
investigation, but clearly in Forces where that practice exists, they have 
created a two-tier system of homicide investigation, one for adults and one 
for children.
Conclusion and implications for Police policy makers
Most infants who die suddenly and unexpectedly, die because of natural 
causes. In older children, where SIDS is not a factor, it is likely that any 
natural disease or genetic condition will be detected by medical science. 
However, unlike the killing of an adult it is disturbingly possible to kill a 
child and leave few, if any, physical clues on the body. The overall 
investigation therefore has to be of high quality to identify any clues that 
have been left by the perpetrator at the scene or in other ways. Pathology 
alone will not necessarily be able to confirm homicide and therefore the 
medical input needs to be complemented by a thorough and searching 
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police investigation, albeit an investigation sensitive to the probability that 
the carers are in fact innocent.
It could be argued that the ‘investigative deficit’ in SUDC is no greater than 
with any adult sudden death investigation, but this paper takes the position 
that child death cases are different for three key reasons: children are not 
meant to die, the greater timescale to reach a conclusive medical 
determination, and the vulnerability of any current or future siblings. Child 
death cases often present complex medical evidence and because the 
pathological findings may be controversial when aired in court, pathologists 
are often extra careful to ensure supporting findings from experts such as 
neuropathologists before confirming their conclusions. Because the 
complex pathology in child death can take several months to provide a 
definitive answer, some actual (but not yet clearly identified) child homicide 
cases are being managed by a very small team who are untrained in major 
crime investigation. Crucially, if there are other children within the 
household, they could be at risk for many months if left with a carer who is 
in fact a murderer.
It is evident that cuts to police service budgets since 2010 have affected all 
elements of policing, including homicide investigation. As a result many 
police force MCTs have seen reductions in personnel of up to one third, 
making it more likely that their demarcation lines for deciding which type 
of cases they take on are drawn tighter and become less flexible. Because 
SUDC investigations rarely offer certainty in the initial stages, in other 
words the early signs are often not clear enough to determine homicide, 
some MCT decision makers feel it is not within their remit to investigate, 
even perhaps where there are enough suspicions to justify a costly Forensic 
Post Mortem. Sometimes, the only way to identify whether or not a SUDC 
is a homicide is for extensive and robust enquiries to be undertaken, but 
the fact that the enquiry is conducted by an under resourced and less than 
optimally trained team may mean that evidence remains undiscovered and 
homicide is never detected. 
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Even CAIU DIs who have clear suspicions about their SUDI case are 
sometimes experiencing "push-back" from MCTs, or in some cases the MCT 
will only provide some limited supplementary assistance whilst the case is 
retained by a DI from CAIU. Respondents agree that with far fewer 
resources than an MCT would routinely deploy for a clear straightforward 
adult homicide, it is likely that in SUDC investigations some important early 
lines of enquiry and actions are not being completed which can mean that 
actual homicide is not determined at all, or that the case is weaker when 
presented to the CPS for a charging decision. This paper does not suggest 
that every MCT has the same policy, but there is enough evidence from the 
current research to draw an inference that unlike an adult death, some 
MCTs will not take on a suspicious child death until and unless there is 
conclusive evidence that homicide is the cause. Normally, however, this 
can only be determined by a post mortem process which takes several 
months, so consequently the ‘Golden Hours’ are compromised due to a lack 
of robust investigation.
Police policy makers and senior leadership teams need to recognise the 
investigative deficit in SUDC investigation. The rhetoric from some Police 
and Crime Commissioners (e.g. PCC Hampshire, 2017) is that despite any 
budget cuts their number one priority is protecting the vulnerable from 
harm. If a person in England and Wales is destined to become a victim of 
homicide there is evidence that it is four times more likely to happen in 
their first year than at any other age (Brookman and Maguire 2005, p.21). 
This makes infants by far the most vulnerable people in society, yet the 
apparently less than adequate police investigation into some SUDCs may 
leave the living or unborn siblings of child homicide victims at risk. 
It may be impractical and in some ways undesirable for the Major Crime 
Teams to take on the full investigation of all SUDC - indeed most of them 
are not crimes – however, the approach described above, whereby a 
trained MCT SIO at least maintains a ‘watching brief’ over every SUDC 
investigation may at least lessen the chances that a child homicide could 
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remain unrecognised as such. The College of Policing Guidance (ACPO, 
2014 p13) states, “Even when there are no apparent suspicions, as a 
minimum it is suggested that a team of three investigators will be required 
to assess and manage scenes, carry out interviews and follow lines of 
enquiry.”  The present study has indicated that this guidance is not always 
being adhered to, and that even this modestly sized team is not available 
to some CAIU senior detectives investigating a SUDC. If an SIO has 
oversight of the case and has some level of accountability for its success, 
then at least the minimum level of resourcing might, in more cases, be 
deployed as a matter of routine.
In respect of training, the College of Policing (ACPO, 2014 p13) suggests 
that any officer deployed to investigate a SUDC should have undertaken 
the Investigation of Sudden Childhood Death Course. It is outside the scope 
of this study to determine whether all police forces in England and Wales 
are providing this training to officers, but certainly the evidence from the 
Poppi Worthington case would indicate that they are not. It may therefore 
be useful for the College of Policing to fund, or conduct further more 
detailed research to establish whether their own recommended training 
programme is available to all officers, and to consider further whether as 
with the PIP Level 3 system for SIOs, there should be some form of 
advanced accreditation for CAIU investigators who are expected to manage 
these difficult and complex investigations.
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